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COMMENT: COPYRIGHT'S PUBLICPRIVATE DISTINCTION
Julie E. Cohent
I would like to focus my remarks on the question of user privacy.
In her fascinating paper for this Symposium, Professor Litman expresses a guarded optimism that in its forthcoming decision in MGM
v. Grokster,' the Court will retain the staple article of commerce doctrine that it first articulated in Sony.2 She opines, however, that the
user privacy strand of the Sony decision is a lost cause. I don't believe that it's possible to retain the staple article of commerce doctrine
while abandoning user privacy. At least in the realm of networked
digital technologies, the two concepts are inextricably linked. To
explain why, I would like to begin by examining a concept that I'll
call copyright's public-private distinction. This distinction does not
concern the presence or absence of state action, but rather the presence or absence of conduct triggering legal accountability.
Copyright's public-private distinction used to be clearly stated on
the surface of the law and transparently visible in the law's operation.
For users, public performances and displays incurred liability; private
performances and displays did not.3 For copyright owners, publication without notice forfeited copyright; private distribution without
notice did not.4 For both users and copyright owners, then, conduct in
public was distinct from conduct in private, and conduct in public had
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Matthew Windsor
for research assistance. Portions of this essay are based on remarks prcscnted at a conference on
copyright and privacy sponsored by the John Marshall Law School in November 2004. See
Julie E. Cohen, et al., Copyright and Privacy-Through the Privacy Lens, 4 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 273 (2005).
I Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004),

cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
2 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see Jessica
Litman, The Sony Paradox,55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 958-59 (2005).
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5) (2000).
4 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-406 (1988); see also 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 7.02-.04, 7.12 (2004).
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legal consequences that did not attach to conduct in private. By necessary implication, some other kinds of user conduct in private also
were sheltered by copyright's public-private distinction. Some of
these kinds of conduct, such as private copying, were formally cov5
ered by section 106 of the Copyright Act. But it wasn't necessary to
formalize the implication of a shelter for private copying, because
nobody was interested in testing it. There was little interest in knowing much about ordinary users and no interest in suing them.
Much has changed. For copyright owners, the public-private distinction ceased to have any meaningful bite in 1989, when publication
without notice ceased to matter.6 For copyright owners, conduct in
public no longer has potentially drastic legal consequences. For users, the result has been different. Increasingly, for users, it seems that
the law no longer recognizes conduct in private. According to the
current Register of Copyrights, digital communications networks and
technologies "seamlessly" transform acts of private copying into acts
of public distribution-acts, that is, in public, with public consequences.7 This view finds support in the views of some prominent
academic commentators, most notably Stanford's Paul Goldstein,
who argued in 1994 that the death of copyright's public-private distinction would be necessary to the success of copyright in the digital
age. 8
For Internet users suspected of infringing copyrights, the consequences of conduct in public also have changed. Conduct in public
now triggers private justice. The private justice process begins with
streamlined procedures for exposing users' identities. For material
posted on the web, these procedures are automatic and entirely extrajudicial. 9 For users of peer-to-peer "P2P" file-sharing networks,
judges are involved, but have acquiesced in the development of a
streamlined protocol for processing so-called John Doe subpoena
requests. This protocol originally evolved as a relatively even-handed
balancing test for evaluating corporate defamation suits against
0
anonymous online whistleblowersi In the P2P context, however, the
17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
2853, 2857-59 (1988), codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-406 (2000).
5

6
7

§ 7,

102 Stat.

Marybeth Peters, Copyright Enters the Public Domain, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A.

701, 708 (2004).
8

PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL

JUKEBOX (1994).
9 See 17 U.S.C.

§ 512(h) (2000).
10 See, e.g., Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. 2001). See generally
David Sobel, The Process that "John Doe" is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet
Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2000) (discussing the legitimate interests of whistleblowers in
anonymity and the importance of incorporating procedural protections into the "John Doe"
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test guarantees virtually automatic disclosure of users' identities.
Courts have concluded that the countervailing interests most likely to
be raised by users-noninfringement, fair use, privacy, and freedom
of expression-either need not be considered or need not be taken
seriously."1 Once disclosure has been obtained, the private justice
process then funnels the information to private settlement service
centers tasked with making users an offer they can't refuse: a quick
and relatively painless alternative to public exposure in federal court
followed by what telephone operatives describe as automatic infringement liability, a damaged credit rating, diminished employment
prospects, and other sorts of public humiliation. 12
This result-a world in which all conduct is public and most justice is private-is one with which most thoughtful commentators do
not seem entirely comfortable. And yet we are reluctant to scrutinize
it in any serious way, and to parse the necessary implications of our
discomfort for the content of copyright law in the digital age.
According to the Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, these
discomfiting implications can be avoided by redrawing the boundaries of secondary liability doctrines to take the pressure off of users.' 3
She does not argue that the law should foreclose liability for private
copying. Instead, she urges rights-holders, whose public conduct no
longer seems subject to much in the way of legal control, to adopt
voluntary norms of self-restraint.' 4 This approach does not seriously
examine copyright's evolving public-private distinction so much as it
purports to offer a sustainable strategy for ignoring it.
Users, moreover, do not get away altogether scot-free under the
Register's proposal. Appropriate norms to govern the public conduct
of users must be publicly inculcated through a combination of persuasion and fear, which means that judiciously targeted lawsuits against
users still have a role to play. 15 Recently, the news supplied an illustration of how the process might work. The wire services reported the
first prison sentence imposed on an undergraduate P2P user, a student

subpoena process).
I See, e.g., Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

12 See Nick Mamatas, Meet John Doe: The RIAA Runs Its Lawsuits as a Volume Business,
and Sometimes Downloaders Just Gotta Settle, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 7, 2005, available at

http://www.villagevoice.com/music/05 10,mamatas,61813,22.html (last accessed May 18, 2005);
Andrew Tran, Woman Silenced by Music Mafia, DAILY TEXAN, Feb. 4, 2005, availableat
http://www.dailytexanonline.com/global-user-elements/pfintpage.cfm?storyid=852298
(last
accessed May 18, 2005).
13 See Peters, supra note 7, at 718.
14 See id. at 714.
15 See id. at 719-22.
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at the University of Arizona.16 The court ordered that after completing a three-month prison term, the student take a copyright law class
at the university's law school. One of my students was sitting in my
office when the e-mail bearing this news arrived, and responded: "He
has to take copyright? Is that like AA or something?" My student's
comment neatly encapsulates the penitential dimension of the publicness that envelops ordinary users. In this world, those of us who
teach copyright can look forward to a new role as twelve-step facilitators for the public expiation of information crimes-an honor that
thus far has eluded comparable course offerings in criminal law, securities law, and federal income taxation, to name just a few of the more
likely candidates.
Professors Mark Lenley and Tony Reese reach precisely the opposite conclusion from Register Peters. They argue that the law
should establish efficient procedures for suing users-publicly-both
to render justice public and to take the pressure off of secondary liability doctrines.' 7 Even they, however, remain unwilling to confront
the problem of public conduct by the ordinary user. They selfconsciously avoid this problem by specifying that the system they
propose would target only the extraordinary user-the chronic uploader whose conduct, by hypothesis, enables ordinary users to engage in acts less self-evidently culpable.' 8 We might say, then, that at
least indirectly, Professors Lemley and Reese seek to preserve copyright's public-private distinction by redrawing it. But the private side
of the distinction remains unexamined, and their proposal still abandons the ordinary user to private justice.
As a preliminary matter, the notion that one can avoid examining
copyright's evolving public-private distinction by adopting a strategy
that trades equipment manufacturers and users off against one other,
in whichever fashion, ignores the political reality on the ground. The
RIAA doesn't want to sue one or the other. It wants to sue both, and
it isn't interested in pursuing the socially efficient remedy except insofar as a new procedural scheme might reduce the operating costs of
its ongoing private justice program.
More fundamentally, however, neither of these approaches will
address rising levels of discomfort with a world of all-public conduct

16 Beth DeFalco, Teen Convicted Under Internet Piracy Law: Arizona Student Believed to
ABC NEWS, Mar. 7, 2005, at
Be First Prosecuted Under State Law for Internet 3Piracy,
3
5600
(last accessed May 18, 2005).
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=
17 Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement With-

out Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004).

18See id. at 1399-1401, 1413.
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and mostly private justice. To resolve that problem, we need a theory
of the ordinary user: a theory of what conduct is private.
Here I come, finally, to Professor Litman's paper. I do not think
that we can be confident of retaining the staple article of commerce
doctrine in any meaningful form without a theory of the ordinary
user. In other words, I do not think that the staple article of commerce doctrine and the question of user privacy can be separated either practically or analytically. From a practical standpoint, the strategy of pursuing equipment manufacturers and the strategy of pursuing
users necessarily go hand in hand. Analytically, the fate of secondary
liability claims increasingly seems to turn on equipment manufacturers' decisions about whether and how to enable privacy for, and collection of information about, their customers. This intermingling
manifests in two distinct but related ways.
First, precise information about users and their activities is increasingly critical to the outcome of indirect infringement lawsuits, and
vice versa. The P2P file-sharing cases clearly illustrate this, but I'd
also like to draw your attention to two disputes that have thus far received comparatively little publicity. The first is the lawsuit by the
motion picture industry against SonicBlue, which had designed a
digital video recorder, the ReplayTV, that enabled automated commercial-skipping and a limited amount of networked P2P file-sharing.
The plaintiffs convinced a magistrate judge to grant a discovery order
requiring SonicBlue to generate a database of what ReplayTV users
had downloaded and shared, so the database could be used in substantiating the secondary liability claims. This order was overturned by
the district court, but not because the court thought the information
wasn't relevant. The court simply thought that principles of discovery law impose no duty to create information that doesn't already
exist.19 The second dispute is really a large number of lawsuits filed
by DirecTV against users who purchased smart card equipment from
third-party manufacturers. These lawsuits were filed after raids on
the manufacturers and seizure of their sales records, which contained
the information about user identities and purchases necessary to en20
able the individual suits.
Second, it is increasingly clear that the way to avoid an indirect infringement lawsuit is to build in knowledge and control in the first
place. In the P2P file-sharing cases, one key point on which the Sev19 Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV, No. CV 01-9358 FMC, 2002 WL 32151632, at
*2-*3 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2002).
20 See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Treworgy, 373 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2004). See generally
DirectTV Defense Website, at http://www.directvdefense.org/hunt/ (last accessed May 18,
2005) (describing the DirecTV litigation campaign and responses to the campaign).
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enth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit differ is how much knowledge and
control will suffice. 2' But the shadow of potential indirect infringement liability extends far beyond P2P. Again, the digital video recorder market illustrates the extent of the effect. Partly because of the
expenses it had incurred in fighting to preserve user privacy,
SonicBlue filed for bankruptcy rather than continue to litigate the
merits of the secondary liability claims. Afterward, the ReplayTV
business was purchased by a Japanese consumer electronics company,
which then agreed to make the design changes demanded by the industry plaintiffs.2 2 The manufacturers of the leading digital video
recorder, the TiVo, made design changes desired by television netand advertisers and have successfully avoided suit, at least so
works
23
far.
Together, the P2P, ReplayTV, and DirecTV disputes demonstrate
that in ways both procedural and evidentiary, the questions of secondary liability and user privacy are inextricably intertwined. Giving up
on user privacy while holding firm for the staple article of commerce
doctrine isn't realistic and isn't even theoretically possible, given
what the inquiry into indirect liability inevitably entails.
Instead, confronting copyright's public-private distinction may offer the best defense of the staple article of commerce doctrine, because it challenges the framing of the secondary liability problem as
primarily one of widespread public illegality. The framing of the
secondary liability problem offered by the petitioners in Grokster rests on a series of equivalencies that lead inexorably to a mandate to design in knowledge and control: All users are P2P users, all
P2P users are infringers, all user conduct is illegal (public) conduct,
and illegal conduct is definitionally incapable of supporting privacy
claims or free speech claims. It is these equivalencies that I would
like to call into question.

21 Compare Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162
(9th Cir. 2004) ("As the district court correctly observed, . . . 'Plaintiffs' notices of infringing
conduct are irrelevant,' because 'they arrive when Defendants do nothing to facilitate, and
cannot do anything to stop, the alleged infringement' of specific copyrighted content."), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 626 (2004), with In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th
Cir. 2003) ("[I]f the infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability as a contributory
infringer the provider of the service must show that it would have been disproportionately costly
for him to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses."), cert. denied sub nom.
Deep v. Recording Industry Ass'n of Am., 124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004).
22 See Eric A. Taub, ReplayTV's New Owners Drop Features That Riled Hollywood, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jul. 21, 2003, at C3.
23See Gina Piccalo, TiVo Will No Longer Skip Past Advertisers, L.A. Times, Nov. 17,
2004, at Al.
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I have written a lot about affirmative theories of user privacy elsewhere.24 Here, I'll briefly note that such a theory includes two essential strands:
First and most obviously, user privacy has an informational dimension. The collection of information about what we see, hear, and
read threatens to produce a chilling effect on intellectual exploration,
and also provides entree for manipulation of the marketplace of
ideas.25 But a purely informational conception of user privacy won't
do anything to counter top-down design mandates aimed at building
in control: at rendering private conduct public in the de facto as well
the de jure sense. It also won't hold up against more narrowly targeted discovery orders that might issue in a world where information
about user activities is of critical importance to the success of secondary liability claims.
Thus we also need to take seriously a second type of privacy interest, which is premised on the asserted legality of some uses of copyrighted material that take place in private spaces. Articulation of this
interest might begin by recognizing the specific values that freedom
to copy serves. 26 Alternatively, it might begin by elaborating the
more general, constitutive value of breathing space for intellectual
27
consumption, exploration, and development.
A fully-articulated theory of the ordinary user is a subject for another day; my purpose here is more modest. One need not subscribe
to the broadest possible vision of constitutive privacy to see the thickening web of connections between user privacy and secondary liability, nor to appreciate the role that an affirmative theory of the ordinary user might play both doctrinally and strategically. For both
third-party innovators and those who seek to hold them legally accountable, a world in which not all users are infringers and not all
user conduct is public is very different from a world in which neither
24 See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A CloserLook at "Copyright Man-

agement" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) [hereinafter Cohen, Read Anonymously]; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudenceof Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1089 (1998); Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003)

[hereinafter Cohen, DRM and Privacy]; Julie E.Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy
and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives];
Julie E. Cohen, Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. &

TECH. POL'Y 375 (2002); Julie E. Cohen Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to
Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029 (2001).
25 See Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 24, at 1423-28; Cohen, Read Anonymously, supro note 24, at 1003-10.
26See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397
(2003); Joseph P. Liu, Owning DigitalCopies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245 (2001); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair
Use DoctrineHarms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).

27See Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 24, at 576-88.

970

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:4

of those things is true. The future of the staple article of commerce
doctrine in the courts and in Congress may hinge on which world is
chosen.

